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Using data from a Japanese time use survey, we show a noteworthy increase in the share of 
employees working unusual hours (late night and early morning) over a period of a decade since the 
mid 1990s. When controlling for changes in hours worked, however, we find that the notable 
increase in the fraction of people working unusual hours was for low-income nonregular employees 
(part time, temporary and contract workers), while relatively higher-income regular employees’ 
work timing remains stable. These observations imply that there is a trend of diversification of work 
timing in Japan between regular and nonregular employees. A possible explanation is that the 
increase in the average hours worked per weekday by regular employees, possibly because of the 
spread of the five-day workweek since the 1990s, increased the demand for services and goods 
during unusual hours, as they returned home. An Oaxaca–Blinder type decomposition suggests that 
such an increase in the average hours worked by regular employees explains partially the rise in the 
employment rate of nonregular employees at unusual times. We also suggest that the negative 
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I. Introduction 
The 24-hour lifestyle has become deeply rooted in some societies around the 
world. Japan is a prime example. Nowadays, many businesses such as evening and 
weekend banking, 24-hour customer services, convenience stores, and all-night movie 
theatres operate outside standard hours in Japan. The 24/7 convenience stores, for 
example, have increased tremendously in number within Japan in recent decades. 
According to a report issued by the Japan Franchise Association, there were 6308 
convenience store outlets in Japan in 1983, and rapid growth since then has increased 
the total to 42 629 stores in 2009.
1 In Metro Tokyo, there are some areas where it is 
impossible to walk 30–40 meters without passing a convenience store. From the 
consumer’s point of view, such 24-hour businesses offer a high degree of convenience 
especially for two-income families with little time to spare during the workday. 
However, longer and nonstandard hours in such businesses are required by the workers 
who work at those hours, which reflects the main characteristics of the service: 
simultaneity. This implies that the number of people who work at unusual hours is also 
growing. 
There are legitimate questions, however, as to what extent people actually work 
unusual hours, how far has employment shifted toward unusual hours, and also, the 
main reason behind the expansion in operating hours. Is it globalization, the advent of 
technology such as mobile phones and the internet, changes in open-hour legislation or 
labor market regulation, or a huge negative demand shock that hit the economy from the 
early 1990s changed Japanese lifestyles? Detailed answers to these questions remain 
elusive. This paper uses a Japanese time use survey to examine how the timing of work 
in Japan has changed since the 1990s and attempts to identify the driving forces behind 
the 24-hour society. 
                                                 
1  Among them, 7-eleven leads the market with 12 743 stores (as of March 2010) in Japan, compared 
with only 6547 stores in the US. 2 
 
There is little research that focuses on the timing aspect.
2 The exceptions are 
pioneering studies by Hamermesh (1999a, b, 2002) that focused on US workers. Using 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1973–1991, Hamermesh (1999a) found that 
the share of US workers working late-night hours declined gradually over time.
3 Given 
the anecdotal evidence above, Japan seems to be heading in the opposite direction from 
that of the US. This paper uses detailed Japanese time use micro data to assess 
empirically whether this conjecture is correct. Specifically, the data we use are from the 
Survey on Time use and Leisure Activities, a time use survey conducted by the Japanese 
government’s Statistics Bureau within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIAC) since 1976. Respondents to the survey, nearly 200,000 
Japanese citizens, annotate their activities in 15-minute increments over two 
consecutive 24-hour periods. This paper uses data from the 1996, 2001, and 2006 
surveys. 
The results of this paper are as follows. First, we show that Japan experienced a 
noteworthy increase in the share of workers working at unusual times (late night and 
early morning) over the period of a decade from the mid 1990s. Second, when 
controlling for changes in hours worked, however, we found that a notable increase in 
the fraction of people at work at such unusual times was evident for low-income 
nonregular employees (part time, temporary and contract workers) while relatively 
higher-income regular employees’ work timing remains stable. These observations 
imply that there is a trend of diversification of work timing in Japan between regular 
and nonregular employees. Third, the increase in the average hours worked per weekday 
by regular employees, possibly because of the spread of the five-day workweek since 
                                                 
2 Much of the literature in economics that makes use of time use surveys is based on analysis that 
measures an aggregate of work time and leisure time. Sociology, however, has a longer history of 
literature analyzing activities by time of the day. For example, Szalai (1972) showed that in the US, 
activities for each time slot differ depending on the city, while Presser (1987) analyzed the timing of 
the work of spouses. The survey by Gershuny and Sullivan (1996) is also of interest. 
3 The series of papers by Hamermesh do not use time use surveys but rather information on the 
usual start and end times of working hours extracted from questions in the CPS. 3 
 
the 1990s, increased services and goods demands at later hours as workers returned 
home. An Oaxaca–Blinder type decomposition suggests that such an increase in the 
average hours worked by regular employees explains partially the rise in the 
employment rate of nonregular employees at unusual times. We also suggest that the 
negative income effect induced low-wage nonregular employees to take jobs at night to 
earn a wage premium. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we explain the theoretical 
underpinnings of our analysis, and in Section III, we provide an overview of our data. In 
Section IV, we examine how the timing of work in Japan has changed over the period of 
a decade from the mid 1990s. In Section V, we further analyze the data to identify the 
main factors that lead people to work at unusual hours. We end with our conclusions in 
Section VI. 
 
II. Theoretical Underpinnings 
Following Winston (1982) and Hamermesh (1999a), we assume that individual i 
chooses daily the timing of work so as to maximize the following utility function 
  24 , , 1 , 0 ) ( , ) , 1 (         t C L w to subject C L U V it it it it it it i  (1)
where Lit is an index function that takes the value 1 if individual i is working at time t 
(an hour block of time within the 24-hour day), and 0 otherwise; wit is the wage rate if 
individual i is working at time t, Cit is consumption at time t, and the consumer goods 
price is 1 for simplicity. We assume here that leisure and consumption are 
intertemporally additively separable, and thus that leisure and consumption are 
separable at each t. Because we are considering a utility function for one day only, we 
do not use a discount rate. We also assume that fatigue does not impact the choice 
between consumption and leisure for individual i at time t, because we are addressing 
decisions for each time block. When the following equation is satisfied, individual i 
works at time t. 
  it it it it it w C U L U       ) / /( ) / (  (2)4 
 
The above equation is based on the same logic as the corner solution in a 
standard labor supply model for an individual’s decision on whether to participate in the 
labor market (whether to work or not work), with the only difference being that the 
decision is on whether to work at time t. The left-hand-side term in equation (2) is the 
reservation wage of individual i at time t. Just as each individual has a different 
reservation wage, each time t has a different reservation wage, even for the same 
individual. In other words, the perceived disutility of an individual will differ depending 
on the work timing. 
We next consider the demand side. We assume that the firm engages in 
profitable production activity during various blocks of time throughout the day. The 
profit function of firm j is given by 
  ) ; , , ( 24 24 1 1 w N a N a j j j j      (3)
where Nt is the number of workers at time t, ajt is labor’s contribution to firm j’s profit at 
time t, and w is the average wage of workers employed by firm j. 
The equilibrium is shown by the standard implicit contract model of Rosen 
(1986). That is, the labor demanded by firm j at time t, holding other conditions 
constant, is supplied by the worker, out of those with the lowest reservation wages at 
time t, with the highest ajt. 
The labor market’s wage premium  t   at  time  t is determined by the distribution 
of workers’ reservation wages at time t and by the distribution of ajt. The wage at each t 
is given by  ) 1 ( t i it w w    . Like Hamermesh (1999a), we assume that there are time 
periods t where firms cannot fully meet their demand for labor when  t   = 0. In other 
words, there are time periods that are undesirable as a time to work for a large number 
of workers although firms can profit from operating at those times, and the wage 
premium ( 0 '  t  ) then serves to motivate workers to supply labor at those times.
4 
                                                 
4  Here, we assume that  t    is determined by the labor market, although the overtime premium that 
applies to hours worked beyond the legal workweek is actually prescribed by law in many countries, 
and Japan is no exception to this. According to Japan’s Labor Standards Act, legal work hours are 
eight hours per day and 40 hours per week, and firms must pay an overtime premium of at least 5 
 
Holding other conditions constant, it is lower-income workers who will be motivated by 
a wage premium to work at times when the marginal disutility of labor is high, i.e., at 
undesirable work times. 
Using this model, Hamermesh (1999a) made the following three assumptions: 
(1) workers’ preferences do not change over time; (2) the higher the proportion of 
workers with relatively low human capital endowment working at a given time, the less 
desirable is that time for workers as a time to work; and (3) technical innovations have a 
uniform impact on the average productivity of workers across different time blocks, and 
impact the productivity of workers in various time blocks. Under these assumptions, 
when average real wages increase (decrease) within an economy, the share of workers 
who work at undesirable times should decrease (increase) because of the income effect. 
Moreover, when income inequality increases, higher income workers take work at 
desirable times while low-income workers are likely to take work at undesirable times 
(to earn a wage premium), and this would lead to a widening discrepancy in work 
timing across income levels. Hamermesh (1999a) found a decline in the number of 
workers who worked during the undesirable times with a high marginal disutility of 
labor,
5  along with an increase in average real wages and also suggested that this trend is 
stronger for individuals with higher incomes, consequently suggesting a widening 
discrepancy in the timing of work based on income level. 
                                                                                                                                               
25 % for any hours that exceed this. If this overtime work is done during late-night hours (defined as 
from 10:00 pm to 5:00 am), the required premium is at least 50 % (a 25 % premium for late-night 
work and a 25 % premium for overtime work). Kawaguchi, Naito, and Yokoyama (2009) showed 
that nearly all of the wage premia actually paid in Japan were above the 25 % level. It is unclear 
whether the legally prescribed wage premium is higher than that determined by the labor market (i.e., 
than the potential wage premium). 
5 Using the CPS and data from the FBI crime report on the number of murders by region, 
Hamermesh (1999b) showed that the fraction of people at work late at night was lower for regions 
with higher murder rates. This could be interpreted as corroboration that late-night work has a high 
marginal disutility of labor. Additional trials in Hamermesh (2002), which extended the CPS data set 
to 1997, also showed a decline in late-night work by US males. 6 
 
This paper focuses on the growing number of nonregular employees with 
relatively lower wages in the Japanese labor market. We here define nonregular 
employees as nonstandard workers, consisting of part time, temporary and contract 
workers. From the early 1990s, Japan experienced a long-term economic slump, Japan’s 
so-called ‘lost decade and a half’. During this period, average real hourly wages have 
declined. Moreover, many firms reduced personnel expenses by cutting back in hiring 
regular employees representing high fixed costs and hiring instead inexpensive 
nonregular employees with relatively low skills. This practice was particularly common 
for new hires, especially among new graduates who entered the labor market during the 
prolonged recession looking for regular full-time jobs. Accordingly, the share of 
nonregular male employees has expanded significantly; from 8.9 % in 1996 to 18.59 % 
in 2006 (figures are from the Labor Force Survey and the Special Survey of the Labour 
Force Survey, MIAC). For those aged under 34, the share of nonregular male employees 
has grown from 10.1 % to 22.1 % during the same period, partly as a consequence of 
having no choice but to be hired as a nonregular employee, or otherwise be 
unemployed.  
Under these circumstances, we expect more nonregular workers have taken 
late-night work because of negative income effects. This is because, in general, workers 
who face real wage declines would either work longer hours or take jobs at undesirable 
times with a wage premium (or both) in order to compensate for the (potential) income 
losses. We expect this may be more likely to occur for nonregular employees, because 
the average hourly wage of nonregular employees is roughly two-thirds of that of 
regular employees and the wage gap has been widening during this period (see Ohta 
2005 for example)
6. For nonregular employees who desire to work as a regular 
employee, the current wages must be much lower than their desirable level, which 
consequently would induce a negative income effect. We take a closer look at this 
below, by separating our samples into regular and nonregular employees. 
                                                 
6 Since there is no ‘equal pay for equal job’ type regulation in Japan, the average hourly wage of 
nonregular employees is considerably lower than that of regular employees.   7 
 
III. Data 
Our data come from the Survey on Time use and Leisure Activities (STULA), a 
Japanese time use survey conducted by MIAC. STULA has been conducted every five 
years since 1976, in the year following the Population Census. It is a large-scale survey 
that first selects approximately 6000 survey districts from those established for the 
Population Census, out of which it selects approximately 70 000 to 100 000 households, 
in which live about 200 000 to 270 000 household members who are at least 10 years 
old. The sample size (number of households and household members) varies each 
survey year. The survey is based on answers from individuals regarding a consecutive 
two-day period that is set for each survey district, and thus the sample size is 
approximately twice the number of household members surveyed. The survey covers 
every day of the week during a nine-day period from late September to early October. 
We use the latest three surveys conducted in 1996, 2001, and 2006. 
The survey respondents recorded their activities, chosen from a list of 20 
possibilities, for each 15-minute increment within the 24-hour day. Our measure of 
hours worked corresponds to the category called work in STULA. The respondents are 
given a detailed definition of work, which states that ‘work includes various types of 
work, such as regular work, preparatory work and clean-up work, overtime, take-home 
work, part-time work, moonlighting, and help with the family business’. It does not 
include time taken for rest breaks or meals during the workday. In addition to their 
activities, respondents are asked other basic information such as age, level of education, 
marital status, whether they have children, number of persons in the household, 
household annual income, number of employees in the workplace, and length of usual 
workweek. For more information about STULA, see Kuroda (2010). 
We limit our analysis to male employees, and exclude the self-employed.
7 The 
basic statistics for our sample are shown in Table 1.
8 
                                                 
7  Students are included in our samples. Because they are small in number, however, excluding them 
would not change the findings of our paper. 8 
 I
IV. Timing of Work 
Changes from 1996 to 2006 
Figs 1(1) and 1(2) show the employment rate during the day, that is, the fraction 
of people at work (employment rate) for each 15-minute intervals in a 24-hour day in 
1996 and 2006 using weekday samples (from Monday through Friday). First, looking at 
Fig. 1(1) for regular employees, the overall shape of the distribution shows the 
employment rate is over 50 % from 8:00 am to 9:00 am, and rises to close to 85 % after 
9:00 am. It then drops to about 30 % around noon (lunchtime), returns to nearly 85 % 
from 1:00 pm to 5:00 pm, and then gradually declines from the early evening. The slight 
declines around 10:00 am and 3:00 pm can probably be attributed to the large number of 
employees who take a break around those times. Looking next at Fig. 1(2) for 
nonregular employees, we find the overall shape of the distribution relatively similar to 
that of regular employees. That is, the employment rate rises from morning and reaches 
its peak before and after noon, and gradually declines from the early evening. 
Changes in these employment rates by time of day also show a common trend 
for both regular and nonregular employees. That is, the tails at both ends of the 
distribution became fatter, as the employment rate from 6:00 pm until 6:00 am (evening, 
late night, and early morning) increase. This is the opposite of findings in Hamermesh 
(1999a), which show a decline in nighttime work in the US. 
The extent of the change in the employment rates, however, is quite different 
between regular and nonregular employees. For example, the fraction of people working 
at midnight in 1996 was not very different between the two groups. In 2006, however, 
the employment rate seems to be double for nonregular employees at midnight, while 
that of regular employees remains stable. A significant rise in employment rates during 
unusual periods (especially from about 10:00 pm to 5:00 am) can be observed for the 
nonregular employees. Another notable feature that can be seen only for nonregular 
                                                                                                                                               
8  Unless noted otherwise, all analysis from this point forward is based on calculations using weights 
provided by the Statistics Bureau of the MIAC. 9 
 
employees is that the employment rates during daytime show a significant drop over 
this decade.   
To examine this more closely, Table 2 shows the employment rate for seven 
times of the day in 1996, 2001, and 2006 for weekdays. The employment rate at 11:00 
am declined 5.6 % for nonregular employees while the rate has not changed for regular 
employees as seen in Fig. 1. Furthermore, the fraction of employees working at 
midnight, very early morning (3:00 am and 5:00 am), evening (7:00 pm), and late night 
(10:00 pm to midnight) has risen over the 10-year period. In particular, those of 
nonregular employees have shown substantial increases during late night and very early 
morning hours. The results of significance tests for differences between 1996 and 2006 
are reported at the bottom of each row. 
It is striking that the employment rate at 7:00 pm on weekdays has risen to 
35.6 % for regular employees in 2006. This implies that more than one-third of regular 
male employees are working at 7:00 pm. It is important to note that Japan’s Labor 
Standards Act was amended in 1988, and the legal workweek was shortened from 48 
hours to 40 hours. This has led to wider adoption of the five-day workweek since the 
1990s, which has resulted in a substantial change in the allocation of work hours 
between weekdays and weekends (Saturday). Kuroda (2010) found that the ratio of 
full-time workers working more than 10 hours per day during weekdays has increased 
from 35 % in 1996 to 43 % in 2006, because many people have begun to squeeze their 
work into five days. The increasing fraction of people working at night may have 
something to do with the longer work hours within the day. Table 3 shows that the 
average hours worked per day during weekdays has increased for regular employees 
while that of Saturday has decreased from 1996 to 2006. Specifically, the hours worked 
per weekday from Monday through Friday averaged 8.86 hours for regular employees 
in 1996, but increased to 9.21 hours in 2006. In contrast, there was a decline in the 
hours worked on Saturday, because of the fact that more people are taking Saturday off. 
Thus, one may argue that the observed change in the timing of work for regular 10 
 
employees was because of the change in the number of hours worked resulting from 
regulatory changes (and/or business cycles). 
For nonregular employees, however, there is no trend in average work hours 
except that a slight decline can be seen for Saturdays. As stated in the previous section, 
workers who faced real wage declines are likely either to work longer hours or to take 
work at undesirable times with a wage premium to compensate for the income losses. It 
seems, however, that the former effect cannot be seen for nonregular employees on 
average. We further consider this point below. However, we first check to see if there 
were any changes in the timing of work even after adjusting for the number of hours 
worked in the next section. 
 
Adjustment of the number of hours worked 
We conduct an Oaxaca–Blinder type decomposition to compare the employment 
rates between 1996 and 2006, which are adjusted for the difference in hours worked. 
We first estimate the following probit model 
  2006 , 1996 , 24 ...., , 1 , ) Pr(     s t e H L its is ts its   (4)
where Lits indicates whether individual i is working at time t, taking a value of 1 for 
working and 0 for not working, s is the survey year, His is the daily work hours of 
individual i in year s, and eits is the error term. Then, we decompose the changes in the 
employment rate from 1996 to 2006 into explained and unexplained factors based on 
Fairlie (2005) and Jahn (2008), as in equation (5). The explained factor F
e represents the 
changes in the employment rate brought about by changes in the number of hours 
worked. The unexplained factor F
u represents the rest of the factors that increased the 
employment rate even when hours worked were fixed at the 1996 level. 




t t        (5) 
Table 4 shows employment rates by time after adjusting for hours worked. The 
table suggests that most of the changes in the fraction of regular employees in each time 
period can be explained by the ‘explained factor’, that is, the changes in the number of 11 
 
working hours. As for nonregular employees, however, the changes in the fraction in 
each time period cannot be explained by the changes in the number of work hours. This 
implies that the cause of the increasing fraction of nonregular employees working at 
unusual times is due to other factors besides the changes in the length of hours worked. 
In the next section, we focus on nonregular employees and look for the causes of the 
increased fraction of employment at unusual hours. 
 
V. Causes of Increased Employment Rates at Unusual Hours 
Demographic change and possible causes 
In addition to the number of working hours, the change in the timing of work 
could also be caused by other factors, such as demographic changes in which people 
marry later in life and have fewer children (which leads to an ageing society), or 
changes in the occupational mix resulting from growth in the service industry. For 
example, if there were a tendency for single workers to work late-night hours and 
elderly workers to work early-morning hours, the demographic changes associated with 
population ageing and marrying later in life could possibly cause the late night and 
early-morning employment rates to increase, even without any change in individuals’ 
lifestyles. It is also conceivable that an increase in the crime rate could necessitate more 
late-night workers such as security guards, thereby raising the late-night employment 
rate. We therefore check below to see if the trends seen in the previous section still hold 
even after holding such changes constant. 
We follow the same method taken in the previous section. Here, we modify 
equation (4) as follows 
  2006 , 1996 , 24 ...., , 1 , ) Pr(
'     s t e X L its is ts its   (6)
where Xis is a set of variables that affect the employment decision of individual i at time 
t, and is is its coefficient vector. The variables we include in Xis are hours of work per 
day, age, education (university graduates = 1), marital status (married = 1), having a 
child less than six years old (having child = 1), and occupations (professional and 12 
 
technical, managerial, sales, and blue collar; base = clerical). Because STULA does not 
contain industry information, we also add the share of the service industry by prefecture 
calculated from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare) in order to control for structural changes in industries. STULA has information 
on residential location by prefecture level; thus, we are able to match the data for each 
sample. 
Besides controlling for demographic and compositional changes, we add three 
variables into Xis to identify the causes of the increased fraction of employment at 
unusual hours: (a) the average number of hours worked by regular employees by 
prefecture, (b) the percentage of people who shop outside the hours of 8:00 am to 8:00 
pm by prefecture, and (c) the male unemployment rate by region. 
The average number of hours worked by regular employees is included in order 
to capture long-working regular employees’ demand for services and goods on their 
way home. As explained in the previous section, the average hours worked per weekday 
by regular employees has increased in these years, possibly as a result of the spread of 
the five-day workweek. This might have delayed the timing of leaving office on 
weekdays, which implies that there should be plenty of demand for services and goods 
at later hours, such as trains, buses, taxies, convenience stores, bars, restaurants, fast 
food shops, and coffee shops. To motivate enough nonregular employees to work at 
those times and meet this demand, firms would need to raise the late-night wage 
premium. 
Second, the percentage of people who shop outside the hours of 8:00 am to 8:00 
pm is included to control for the effect of the open-hour legislation for large stores that 
was abolished in 2000. Before 2000, large stores of more than 500 square meters were 
under stringent control over opening hours by the Japanese government in order to 
protect local small shops, and thus large stores were unable to operate after 8:00 pm. 
After 2000, the legislation was deregulated, which enabled large stores to operate 24 
hours per day in principle. To account for the effect of this deregulation, we calculate 
the percentage of people who shop during the period from 8:00 pm to 8:00 am using 13 
 
STULA, as a proxy for the needs of consumers shopping at night. In STULA, there is 
an activity called shopping among 20 possible activities. We use 1 to indicate an 
individual who did shopping for at least 15 minutes from 8:00 pm to 8:00 am and 0 
otherwise, and calculate the percentage of people who shop during the period by 
prefecture. In order to capture the effect of the changes in the legislation only, we use 
only nonworker samples to calculate the shopping rate. 
Lastly, we include regional male unemployment rates in order to control for the 
tightness of the local labor market. 
 
Adjusted Timing of Work 
Tables 5(1) to 5(4) show the results of the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition of 
nonregular employee’s employment rates for four undesirable times: (1) midnight, (2) 
3:00 am, (3) 10:00 pm and (4) 11:00 pm. First, looking at midnight in Table 5(1) when 
the employment rate increased by 4 % from 1996 to 2006, age is the only component 
that significantly explains the increase in the employment rate. Because the average age 
decreased from 45.6 to 42.3, the growing number of younger employees is one of the 
factors explaining the rise in the employment rate of nonregular employees at midnight. 
Otherwise, however, the table confirms that there is virtually no change even after 
controlling for changes in demography and the occupational mix. 
Table 5(2) for 3:00 am also shows that even after controlling for various factors, 
two-thirds of the increase in the employment rate at this time is still unexplained. The 
increase in the number of single workers is the only explained factor at this time, while 
the blue-collar dummy shows a significantly negative contribution in the unexplained 
factor. 
Next, the results shown in Table 5(3) for 10:00 pm provide a somewhat different 
picture in that most of the increase in the employment rate is explained by the changes 
in the control variables. Increases in the percentage of young and single employees are 
again significant at the 5 % level. Furthermore, the increase in the average hours 
worked by regular employees explains almost three-quarters of the total change in the 14 
 
employment rate. We interpret this finding to imply that there have been increases in the 
demand for services and goods at later hours on the way home by regular employees 
who work until night. It is inferred that the late night wage premium to meet this 
demand consequently induced nonregular employees’ labor supply at this time. 
However, when we look at the result for 11:00 pm, age is the only variable that 
is significant as the explained factor. Instead, the share of the service industry, 
percentage of people shopping from 8:00 pm to 8:00 am, and regional unemployment 
rate are significant as the unexplained factor. 
 
Interpreting the increase in night work of nonregular employees 
To summarize, the Oaxaca–Blinder type decomposition of the changes in 
nonregular employee’s employment rates during undesirable times in Tables 5(1) to 
5(4) show that most of the increases are not explained by changes in demographic, 
occupational, or industrial composition, as well as other factors such as deregulation of 
operating hours for large retailers. The exception is the regular employee’s working 
hours that have a positive effect on the nonregular employee’s employment rate at 10 
pm. How should we interpret these results? 
One possibility is that the large unexplained factor leading to the increase in 
nighttime employment rates is the negative income effects of nonregular employees, 
which is the opposite of the phenomenon observed in the US. As we explained, 
Hamermesh (1999a) found a decline in US employment rates at night along with an 
increase in the average real wages. Conversely, the Japanese labor market experienced 
declining real wages after the bursting of the bubble economy, which would have 
induced negative income effects on the timing of work especially for the low wage 
earners such as nonregular employees. That is, the more the workers’ potential market 
wages decline, the more they tend to take jobs at undesirable hours to compensate for 
the (potential) income loss. 
Another interpretation is related to the sustained recession in post-bubble Japan 
that reduced the number of regular employees working daytime hours, while there was a 15 
 
trend among businesses, particularly in the service industry, to greatly expand operating 
hours in the hope of sparking at least some demand. This may have resulted in the more 
highly educated, higher income employees working during the desirable daytime hours 
as regular employees, while the other workers, having been squeezed out, had no choice 
but to work at other times.
9 We assume these factors, coming both from the labor 
supply and demand sides, brought about the increase in the employment rate of 
nonregular employees at undesirable times. 
Then, how should we evaluate these increases in employment rates of 
nonregular employees at undesirable hours? As far as consumers who work overtime 
are able to purchase services and goods on their way home, or the workers who fail to 
find a job during daytime are able to get nonregular jobs at night, it may be a better 
outcome for all workers. However, issues such as health problems caused by nighttime 
work also cannot be ignored. It is sometimes argued that night work as well as long 
working hours could adversely affect one’s health. 
In fact, we can observe that the increase in the nighttime employment rate is 
accompanied by longer working hours. Fig. 2 is a radar chart where we plot the average 
daily work hours for those who work at each time of the day. It is found that the solid 
line (the average hours worked in 2006) expands to the northeast direction from the 
dotted line (those in 1996), which indicates the increasing average hours worked for 
those who work from midnight to 6:00 am. This indicates that the average hours worked 
for those working from midnight to early morning increased in 2006. Furthermore, Fig. 
2 suggests that the average hours worked by nonregular employees who work from 
midnight to early morning in 2006 is almost the same length as that of daytime regular 
employees in 1996 (shown using triangle dots). It is important to note that we have 
shown in Table 2 that the average hours worked by all nonregular employees is much 
shorter than that of regular employees, and has not changed during the decade. However, 
Fig. 2 indicates that nonregular employees who work during undesirable night hours 
                                                 
9 An increase in the fraction of workers working at unusual times as a result of wider use of the 
internet could be another possibility. This is an area for further study. 16 
 
began to work as many hours in 2006 as that of daytime regular employees. This 
finding may also be evidence of the negative income effect for those who work during 
undesirable times as described in Section II. That is, workers who need to earn more at 
low wage rates tend to work longer hours to earn more income. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper aimed to understand Japanese worker’s recent lifestyle changes by 
observing the timing of work during the day, using a Japanese time use survey from 
1996 to 2006. 
We showed that Japan had a noteworthy increase in the share of employees 
working at unusual times (late night and early morning) over a decade starting in the 
mid 1990s. When controlling for changes in hours worked, however, we found that the 
notable increase in the fraction of people at work at such unusual times was evident for 
low-income nonregular employees while relatively higher-income regular employees’ 
work timing remained stable. These observations imply that there is a trend of 
diversification of work timing in Japan between regular and nonregular employees, 
suggesting another aspect of inequality.
10 The increase in the employment rate during 
late night and early-morning hours, which are generally thought of as undesirable hours 
with a high marginal disutility of work, is an interesting result, because Hamermesh 
(1999a) found opposite results: a decline in the late night and early-morning 
employment rate in the US. 
Why has the employment rate for nonregular employees during late night and 
early-morning hours increased in Japan? We pointed out a possible explanation in that 
the increase in the average hours worked per weekday by regular employees possibly 
because of the spread of the five-day work week increased the demand for services and 
goods at later hours as workers returned home. An Oaxaca–Blinder type decomposition 
                                                 
10 Kuroda and Yamamoto (2010) showed that notable increases in the late night and very 
early-morning employment rates since the mid 1980s was evident among full-time workers with low 
levels of both education and income in Japan. 17 
 
suggested that such increases in the average hours worked by regular employees 
explains partially the rise in the employment rate of nonregular employees at unusual 
times. However, unexplained factors remain. We conclude that the remaining factor 
relates to the negative income effect, which induces low-wage nonregular employees to 
take jobs at night to earn a wage premium. Another interpretation is that the job 
opportunities are limited to nonregular work at night, thus people have no choice but to 
accept jobs at those undesirable times because of the prolonged recession. 
This growth in work timing differences during a sustained economic slump 
could probably be interpreted as evidence that people were happy just to have the 
opportunity to work, even at undesirable times. If that is the case, income inequality is 
lower than it would have been with absolutely no change in the work timing gap. In 
other words, another way to frame these phenomena is that although gaps in the timing 
of work arose during Japan’s lost decade, this was a successful way to avoid 
unemployment and brought the added benefit of suppressing the increase in income 
inequality. 
There has been an increase in health problems related to overworking and stress 
in Japan in the last several years; however, this may be related to the rising number of 
people working late night and early-morning hours. Some interesting issues for further 
study are the causes of differences in the timing of work and whether late-night work 
has anything to do with Japan’s increase in overworking and stress-related health 
problems. 
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Table 1: Basic statistics 
 
 
Notes:  Weekday (Monday through Friday) respondents. 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
  
Age 41.12 (10.98) 43.28 (15.18)
Education (university graduates = 1) 0.34 (0.47) 0.19 (0.39)
Marital status (married = 1) 0.72 (0.45) 0.49 (0.50)
Child (having child = 1) 0.18 (0.38) 0.04 (0.19)
Occupations Professional + technical 0.16 (0.36) 0.10 (0.29)
Managerial 0.04 (0.19) 0.00 (0.06)
Clerical 0.18 (0.38) 0.10 (0.30)
Sales 0.15 (0.36) 0.08 (0.28)
Blue collar 0.48 (0.50) 0.72 (0.45)
Average hours worked per day 8.98 (3.28) 6.75 (3.75)
Sample sizes 88801 8052
Regular employees Nonregular employees21 
 




+, *, ** indicate 10, 5, 1 % statistical significance, respectively. 
  
Regular employees
1996 0.036 0.024 0.032 0.853 0.305 0.077 0.054
2001 0.042 0.025 0.032 0.841 0.340 0.092 0.063
2006 0.042 0.029 0.035 0.853 0.359 0.094 0.062
96 --> 06 0.006 ** 0.004 ** 0.003 * 0.000   0.054 ** 0.017 ** 0.008 **
Nonregular employees
1996 0.041 0.025 0.038 0.691 0.151 0.070 0.053
2001 0.062 0.045 0.056 0.620 0.167 0.084 0.074
2006 0.084 0.057 0.066 0.635 0.210 0.097 0.083
96 --> 06 0.043 ** 0.032 ** 0.028 ** -0.056 ** 0.059 ** 0.027 ** 0.030 **
5:00 am 11:00 am 7:00 pm 10:00 pm 11:00 pm midnight 3:00 am22 
 




+, *, ** indicate 10, 5, 1 % statistical significance, respectively. 
  
1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006
Weekday 8.86 8.87 9.21 0.34 ** 6.76 6.58 6.86 0.10  
Saturday 4.97 4.58 4.47 -0.49 ** 4.98 4.64 4.70 -0.28 *










Notes:  ‘difference’ = employment rate at time t in 2006 – employment rate at time t in 1996. 
+, *, ** indicate 10, 5, 1 % statistical significance, respectively. 
  
Regular employees
difference 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.054 0.017 0.008
(explained) 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.003 ** 0.012 ** 0.046 ** 0.015 ** 0.007 **
(unexplained) 0.004 + 0.002 0.002 -0.012 ** 0.009 + 0.003 0.001
Nonregular employees
difference 0.043 0.032 0.028 -0.056 0.059 0.027 0.030
(explained) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.011 0.003 0.003
(unexplained) 0.040 ** 0.030 ** 0.026 ** -0.059 ** 0.049 ** 0.024 * 0.027 **
11:00 pm midnight 3:00 am 5:00 am 11:00 am 7:00 pm 10:00 pm24 
 
Table 5: Employment Rate Decomposition (Adjusting for Demography and Other 
Possible Changes) 
(1)  Midnight 
 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
+, *, ** indicate 10, 5, 1 % statistical significance, respectively. 
The number of observations is 2,945 for year 2006 and 2,767 for year 1996.
Year 2006 Year 1996 Year 2006 Year 1996 Explained Unexplained
Dependent variable 0.084 0.041 - - 0.0089 0.0336+
Employment rate at midnight (0.277) (0.198) - - (0.015) (0.018)
Control variables
The number of hours worked 6.861 6.762 0.1131** 0.0935** 0.0016 0.0178
(3.829) (3.647) (0.021) (0.019) (0.003) (0.030)
Age 42.297 45.645 -0.0112* -0.0132* 0.0059+ 0.0117
(14.825) (15.180) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.044)
0.203 0.174 0.0682 -0.1583 0.0002 0.0054
(0.402) (0.379) (0.174) (0.212) (0.001) (0.007)
0.420 0.592 -0.2298 -0.1431 0.0055 -0.0063
(0.494) (0.492) (0.153) (0.145) (0.004) (0.016)
0.035 0.045 -0.1396 -0.0646 0.0002 -0.0004
(0.184) (0.207) (0.220) (0.257) (0.000) (0.002)
0.623 0.578 1.1965 0.1708 0.0073 0.0804
(0.098) (0.091) (0.773) (0.808) (0.007) (0.094)
Occupations: (base = Clerical)
Professional and technical 0.085 0.116 -0.8394* -0.1160 0.0029 -0.0102
(0.279) (0.320) (0.404) (0.347) (0.002) (0.008)
Sales 0.081 0.080 0.0921 0.0774 0.0000 0.0002
(0.272) (0.271) (0.402) (0.355) (0.000) (0.006)
Blue collar 0.729 0.682 0.0901 0.1965 0.0008 -0.0100
(0.444) (0.466) (0.373) (0.299) (0.002) (0.044)
Averege hours worked 9.203 8.854 -0.1886 0.1699 -0.0067 -0.4273
by regular employees (0.274) (0.184) (0.187) (0.285) (0.012) (0.420)
Percentage of people shopping 1.174 0.754 -0.0707 -0.3300* -0.0106 0.0310
from 8 pm to 8 am (0.386) (0.380) (0.168) (0.161) (0.012) (0.027)
Regional unemployment rate 4.859 3.845 0.0329 -0.0964 0.0020 0.0692
(1.026) (0.559) (0.073) (0.110) (0.010) (0.072)
Constant - - -0.8985 -2.9353 0.2722
- - (1.837) (2.741) (0.440)
Child (having child = 1)
Share of service industry in prefecture
Marital status (married = 1)
Education (university graduates = 1)
Mean  Estimated coefficients Oaxaca decomposition25 
 
Table 5: Employment Rate Decomposition (Adjusting for Demography and Other 
Possible Changes) 
(2)  3:00 am 
 
Note: See Table 5(1). 
Year 2006 Year 1996 Year 2006 Year 1996 Explained Unexplained
Dependent variable 0.057 0.025 - - 0.0101 0.0218+
Employment rate at midnight (0.231) (0.155) - - (0.008) (0.013)
Control variables
The number of hours worked 6.861 6.762 0.1296** 0.0806** 0.0011 0.0234
(3.829) (3.647) (0.031) (0.018) (0.002) (0.025)
Age 42.297 45.645 -0.0011 -0.0092+ 0.0013 0.0252
(14.825) (15.180) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.022)
0.203 0.174 -0.0005 0.2219 0.0002 -0.0029
(0.402) (0.379) (0.213) (0.228) (0.001) (0.004)
0.420 0.592 -0.3075* -0.4235* 0.0055* 0.0046
(0.494) (0.492) (0.142) (0.177) (0.002) (0.008)
0.035 0.045 0.3496 0.2631 -0.0004 0.0003
(0.184) (0.207) (0.234) (0.284) (0.000) (0.001)
0.623 0.578 -0.2561 -2.9355** -0.0036 0.1104
(0.098) (0.091) (0.795) (0.754) (0.003) (0.069)
Occupations: (base = Clerical)
Professional and technical 0.085 0.116 -1.4876** 0.1691 0.0033 -0.0126
(0.279) (0.320) (0.517) (0.405) (0.002) (0.008)
Sales 0.081 0.080 -0.3862 0.3849 -0.0000 -0.0044
(0.272) (0.271) (0.445) (0.296) (0.000) (0.004)
Blue collar 0.729 0.682 -0.1431 0.9118** 0.0001 -0.0516+
(0.444) (0.466) (0.406) (0.248) (0.001) (0.029)
Averege hours worked 9.203 8.854 0.0072 -0.0054 0.0003 0.0078
by regular employees (0.274) (0.184) (0.188) (0.329) (0.006) (0.236)
Percentage of people shopping 1.174 0.754 -0.0560 -0.0863 -0.0019 0.0013
from 8 pm to 8 am (0.386) (0.380) (0.190) (0.174) (0.007) (0.016)
Regional unemployment rate 4.859 3.845 0.0163 0.2030* 0.0042 -0.0520
(1.026) (0.559) (0.069) (0.102) (0.006) (0.045)
Constant - - -2.2286 -1.8350 -0.0276
- - (1.755) (3.069) (0.247)
Child (having child = 1)
Share of service industry in prefecture
Marital status (married = 1)
Education (university graduates = 1)
Oaxaca decomposition Mean  Estimated coefficients26 
 
Table 5: Employment Rate Decomposition (Adjusting for Demography and Other 
Possible Changes) 
(3)  10:00 pm 
 
Note: See Table 5(1). 
Year 2006 Year 1996 Year 2006 Year 1996 Explained Unexplained
Dependent variable 0.097 0.070 - - 0.0235+ 0.0027
Employment rate at midnight (0.297) (0.256) - - (0.013) (0.015)
Control variables
The number of hours worked 6.861 6.762 0.1092** 0.1219** 0.0017 -0.0098
(3.829) (3.647) (0.018) (0.017) (0.003) (0.012)
Age 42.297 45.645 -0.0101* -0.0104* 0.0049* 0.0013
(14.825) (15.180) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.032)
0.203 0.174 -0.0127 -0.3979* -0.0005 0.0079
(0.402) (0.379) (0.152) (0.159) (0.001) (0.018)
0.420 0.592 -0.3148** -0.0513 0.0061* -0.0160
(0.494) (0.492) (0.121) (0.116) (0.003) (0.040)
0.035 0.045 0.2802 -0.0609 -0.0002 0.0016
(0.184) (0.207) (0.185) (0.229) (0.000) (0.004)
0.623 0.578 -1.1384+ 0.8170 -0.0034 -0.1322
(0.098) (0.091) (0.659) (0.680) (0.004) (0.297)
Occupations: (base = Clerical) (0.237) (0.166) (0.001) (0.010)
Professional and technical 0.085 0.116 0.3420 0.2932 -0.0015 0.0005
(0.279) (0.320) (0.231) (0.244) (0.001) (0.004)
Sales 0.081 0.080 0.2265 -0.1037 0.0000 0.0030
(0.272) (0.271) (0.217) (0.255) (0.000) (0.008)
Blue collar 0.729 0.682 0.0725 -0.0908 0.0000 0.0132
(0.444) (0.466) (0.176) (0.187) (0.001) (0.037)
Averege hours worked 9.203 8.854 0.2688 0.1031 0.0144* 0.1675
by regular employees (0.274) (0.184) (0.175) (0.244) (0.007) (0.501)
Percentage of people shopping 1.174 0.754 0.0398 -0.2724* -0.0069 0.0336
from 8 pm to 8 am (0.386) (0.380) (0.128) (0.129) (0.007) (0.076)
Regional unemployment rate 4.859 3.845 0.1224* -0.2127* 0.0090 0.1544
(1.026) (0.559) (0.060) (0.096) (0.007) (0.348)
Constant - - -4.1655* -2.2136 -0.2223
- - (1.691) (2.333) (0.624)
Share of service industry in prefecture
Child (having child = 1)
Education (university graduates = 1)
Marital status (married = 1)
Oaxaca decomposition Mean  Estimated coefficients27 
 
Table 5: Employment Rate Decomposition (Adjusting for Demography and Other 
Possible Changes) 
(4)  11:00 pm 
 
Note: See Table 5(1). 
  
Year 2006 Year 1996 Year 2006 Year 1996 Explained Unexplained
Dependent variable 0.083 0.053 - - 0.0165 0.0130
Employment rate at midnight (0.276) (0.224) - - (0.013) (0.014)
Control variables
The number of hours worked 6.861 6.762 0.0941** 0.1187** 0.0014 -0.0147
(3.829) (3.647) (0.018) (0.021) (0.002) (0.012)
Age 42.297 45.645 -0.0082+ -0.0151** 0.0044* 0.0272
(14.825) (15.180) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.028)
0.203 0.174 0.1081 -0.5359** -0.0002 0.0102
(0.402) (0.379) (0.154) (0.203) (0.001) (0.006)
0.420 0.592 -0.2660* 0.1144 0.0039 -0.0181
(0.494) (0.492) (0.121) (0.126) (0.002) (0.013)
0.035 0.045 0.2389 -0.1680 -0.0001 0.0015
(0.184) (0.207) (0.185) (0.220) (0.000) (0.001)
0.623 0.578 -1.0186 1.4134+ -0.0016 -0.1270+
(0.098) (0.091) (0.671) (0.778) (0.003) (0.067)
Occupations: (base = Clerical)
Professional and technical 0.085 0.116 0.6336* 0.1167 -0.0019 0.0047
(0.279) (0.320) (0.290) (0.318) (0.001) (0.005)
Sales 0.081 0.080 0.6917* -0.1747 0.0000 0.0062
(0.272) (0.271) (0.270) (0.308) (0.001) (0.004)
Blue collar 0.729 0.682 0.6852** -0.0225 0.0023 0.0440
(0.444) (0.466) (0.225) (0.228) (0.001) (0.033)
Averege hours worked 9.203 8.854 0.0742 -0.2363 0.0026 0.2429
by regular employees (0.274) (0.184) (0.178) (0.250) (0.008) (0.255)
Percentage of people shopping 1.174 0.754 0.0945 -0.3320* -0.0044 0.0345+
from 8 pm to 8 am (0.386) (0.380) (0.133) (0.144) (0.007) (0.020)
Regional unemployment rate 4.859 3.845 0.1452* -0.2566* 0.0102 0.1429*
(1.026) (0.559) (0.062) (0.109) (0.007) (0.069)
Constant - - -3.2396+ 0.6348 -0.3414
- - (1.771) (2.414) (0.301)
Oaxaca decomposition
Education (university graduates = 1)
Marital status (married = 1)
Child (having child = 1)
Share of service industry in prefecture
Mean  Estimated coefficients28 
 
Fig. 1: Employment rate by time on weekdays (all male employees) 
 
(1)  Regular Employees 
 
(2)  Nonregular Employees 
 































Fig. 2: Average daily work hours by time of the day 
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